On Friday, the Tor Project pushed out version 0.4.9.17, an emergency security release aimed at relay operators across its anonymity network. The cause: a sustained distributed denial-of-service attack that has hit most of the relays carrying the network's traffic.

The attackers are flooding relays with circuit creation requests. Every Tor connection passes through a circuit, a three-relay path the client builds with a cryptographic handshake. Building that circuit costs the relay processor time. Send enough of them and the relay stops responding to legitimate traffic.

"This is not an easy problem to address, as relays across the network are being overwhelmed by a massive flood of client circuits," the Tor Project's David Goulet wrote in the release announcement. "We are actively evaluating additional defenses and so expect further releases in the near future."

The IPv6 Weakness

The most important fix in 0.4.9.17 addresses how Tor's DoS defenses handle IPv6 addresses. IPv6 gives every local network a /64 block by default, which is 18.4 quintillion addresses. An attacker who controls a single /64 can show up with a different source address on every request, rendering per-address rate limits useless.

Advertisement

TROVE-2026-031, as the project catalogs the flaw, now makes relays count entire /64 blocks as a unit rather than individual addresses. The release also drops DNS resolution replies with invalid hostnames and patches minor issues in HTTP proxy stream isolation and the ntor-v3 handshake.

The Attack Shifted Within Hours

Relay operators on the project's forum have been comparing notes since the wave began. One operator running a middle relay in Japan reported the circuit flood started on November 6 and that defenses in the two prior versions, 0.4.9.15 and 0.4.9.16, did not stop it. After upgrading to 0.4.9.17, the same operator reported the flood came back within a few hours in a different shape.

In that relay's logs, the warning "Your computer is too slow to handle this many circuit creation requests" appeared as often as 400,000 times a minute.

The Tor Project thanked relay operators for their help. "The tor-relays@ mailing list has been very active and we are very grateful for your time, effort, and support," Goulet wrote.

Advertisement

What Users and Relay Operators Should Do

Relay operators should update to 0.4.9.17 as soon as possible. The Tor Project says no other action is needed after the upgrade, but the organization expects further releases, so operators will want to monitor the project's forum and the tor-relays mailing list.

For regular Tor Browser users, the fix will arrive in a future browser release. The most recent major browser version, Tor Browser 16, shipped November 7 with its own embedded Tor daemon. The project's announcement does not claim any loss of anonymity from the attack, only degraded availability as relays struggle under load.

The Tor network runs on more than seven thousand volunteer-operated relays. Attacks on volunteer-run infrastructure have historically proven difficult to defend against because the network cannot simply buy its way out of the problem. The attackers are spending resources. The defenders, mostly individuals with a spare machine and a political commitment, have to spend theirs too.

Whether the attackers have a specific objective or are simply probing the network's resilience remains unknown. The Tor Project has not publicly attributed the campaign.